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Abstract
We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional pol-
icy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some issues more salient
than others. We find that special interest groups that lobby on less
salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their preferred
policy, compared to the ones that lobby on more salient issues. When
we introduce two types of citizens, who differ with respect to the
salience of issues, we find pooling equilibria where voters are not able
to offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result
is in sharp contrast with previous work on unidimensional citizen-
candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the im-
plemented policy. In an extension of the model we provide citizens
with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to lobbies in or-
der to increase their power. With more than one lobby per dimension
we have two findings. First, under some conditions only the most
extreme lobbies receive contributions. Second, the effectiveness of a
lobby is maximized when the salience of an issue is low in the popu-
lation and high for a small group of citizens.
JEL-Classication: D72, D74, D78
Keywords: voting, lobbying, salience, citizen-candidate
1 Introduction
In 2012 in the US 3.30 billion dollars were spent on lobbying the Congress
and federal agencies. In 2012 there were 12411 unique, registered lobbying
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firms in the US1. The amount of resources devoted to this activity and the
number of firms involved shows the relevance of lobbying in the policy making
process. In the political economy literature with a fixed number of candi-
dates, the equilibrium policy, resulting from the interaction of the voting and
lobbying processes, is determined by the maximization of a weighted sum of
the utility function of lobbies and some aggregate welfare function of voters,
see Grossman and Helpman (1996). Lobbying therefore, in these models, has
always an effect on the implemented policy.
A recent literature, initiated by Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), has endogenized the number of candidates, allowing politi-
cians to be selected, by majority voting, among those citizens who choose to
enter the electoral campaign. The citizen-candidate framework was meant to
provide useful insights on the endogenous positions of candidates and their
number. Nonetheless the citizen-candidate model with lobbying, introduced
by Besley and Coate (2001) on a unidimensional policy space, predicts that
lobbies do not have an effect on the equilibrium policy. Indeed voters can
always support candidates with offsetting policy preferences, thus lobbying
changes the identity of the elected politician, but not the implemented policy.
Considering that the possibility of finding offsetting candidates is inherent
of citizen-candidate models, it seems that they are not fit for understanding
lobbying.
In this paper we overcome this limitation, investigating a citizen-candidate
model with lobbying on a multidimensional policy space. A multidimensional
policy space is a very realistic environment for studying the interaction be-
tween voters and candidates, because citizens truly have preferences on many
different issues, from taxation to environmental topics and moral values. All
these matters are subject to the action of elected politicians.
Multidimensionality innovates Besley and Coate (2001) because, with
many topics in the policy space, it is natural to differentiate them based
on their salience. Indeed in every national and local political race voters
consider some issues more important than others. For example in the United
States in the 2012 the state of the economy was important for 92% voters2.
Issues like gay marriage and abortion was instead important for 38 % voters.
In the model presented here we introduce two types of citizens, differentiated
by their ranking of issues. For example, one type gives more importance to
state of the economy, while the other type considers the moral issue the most
relevant. The type is private information of the citizen. Still for each type
citizens have heterogenous preferences for policies in each dimension, e.g. for
1http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php
2http://www.gallup.com/poll/153029/economy-paramount-issue-voters.aspx
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the type that considers the state of the economy the most relevant, there are
citizens who believe in state intervention, and others who think there should
be more market and less state. Given that candidates are citizens, they
also have types. To keep the analysis more intuitive we introduce a single
unidimensional lobby per issue. When faced with contributions from lobbies
after elections, an elected politician of a type that considers the economy
more relevant, will please more the lobby on the moral issue, because the
policy preferences of the politician are weaker on that topic. Therefore,
different types of politicians implement different policies. Going back to the
voting stage, we prove that there are pooling equilibria, in which citizens
are not able to identify the type of the candidates, and vote on expected
policies. Hence they will offset lobbying either too much or too little, and as
anticipated, in equilibrium lobbying will have an effect on the implemented
policy.
There are other results that flow naturally from the setting of the game.
One of them is that if, for all types of citizens, the salience of an issue is
lowered, then the lobby that works on that topic increases its influence on the
implemented policy. Thus the most effective lobbies are the ones that work
on the topics that people care less about. This result provides an explanation
of why politicians are more sensitive to lobbying, and therefore less sensitive
to voters’preferences, on some issues. For example, in January 2003, 63 % of
Americans were against the US government’s decision of invading Iraq3. In
2005, 64% of Italian voters, 55% among rightwing ones, were in favour of civil
unions, but the parliament rejected the law proposal4. Still in Italy, in 2010,
the parliament voted laws for building new nuclear plants and privatizing the
public water system. Nevertheless, a citizen initiative in 2011 brought 54 %
of the italian voting population to vote on these issues, and 96% of citizens
who showed up voted for the rejection of these laws.
Another finding that emerges from the equilibrium analysis is that some
citizens, with the same most preferred policy but with a different ranking
of issues, vote for different candidates. An example referred to the Ameri-
can Presidential elections of 2012 would be two citizens, both wishing more
income redistribution and against legal abortion, who voted for different can-
didates, because one thought the economy was more important than moral
issues and supported Obama, while the other citizen felt the opposite and
voted for Romney.
In our game we find also separating equilibria, in which only one type per
candidate has an incentive to enter the electoral campaign. These equilibria
3http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/23/opinion/polls/main537739.shtml
4http://www.repubblica.it/2005/i/sezioni/politica/prodipacs/itafavo/itafavo.html?ref=search
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open the way to 3 candidates’ equilibria, which were excluded in Besley
and Coate (1997). Indeed in the seminal paper of Besley and Coate (1997)
strategic voters never gave their vote to a third candidate, even though he
was the closest to them, because they preferred to elect for sure their second
most preferred candidate. In our game there can be a third candidate that
in equilibrium enters because he hopes that at least one of the two other
running candidates will withdraw, making him win for sure. An example
would be Mario Monti, who entered the Italian national electoral campaign
in 2013, in the hope of not having Berlusconi as a competing candidate. In
this case Monti would have had a high probability of winning the elections,
because there would not be any candidate on the right. But if Berlusconi
was to run, which he did, Monti would have lost.
An extension of the model partially endogenizes the power of lobbies.
We provide citizens with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to
lobbies in order to increase their ability to move the implemented policy
closer to their bliss point. With more than one lobby per issue we find that,
under some conditions, only the more extreme lobbies in every dimension
receive contributions. When studying the effect of the salience of an issue on
citizens’ contributions to lobbying, we find that the effectiveness of a lobby
is maximized when the salience of a topic is low for most of citizens and high
for a small group. This small group is indeed the special interest group the
finances the lobby.
All the results mentioned above are derived from the three main ingre-
dients of the model. The main contribution of this paper is thus to bring
together in a citizen candidate model lobbying, multidimensionality of the
policy space and salience of issues.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 makes a literature review on
voting and lobbying. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents the
results, section 5 endogenizes lobbying, while section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
An extended literature exists on voting and lobbying, in most of it lobby-
ing is modeled through menu auctions: the politician receives contributions
contingent on the implemented policy. See Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Besley and Coate (2001). The citizen
candidate model has been developed separately by Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Osborne and Slivinski (1996) study the
model on a single dimension and assumes sincere voting, while Besley and
Coate (1997) prove their results on a multidimensional setting with strategic
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voters. Besley and Coate (2001) take the one dimensional citizen candidate
model and add lobbies. In this paper in equilibrium lobbying is always offset
by the voters, who foresee the subsequent lobbying and strategically delegate
undoing the work of lobbies. Even though lobbies pay their contributions and
there is an effect of interest groups on the choice of candidates, there is no
effect on the implemented policy. We will study the citizen candidate model
on a multidimensional policy space, with salient issues, with strategic vot-
ing and lobbies. Moreover coherently with the idea that information about
the general salience of issues is incomplete, during the electoral campaign
we assume that there are different types of voters, each of them identified
with a different ranking of issues. It is not known which type is a voter
by the other citizens. In this way we also address the strategic delegation,
showing that in some cases there is a visible of effect of lobbying on the
implemented policy. Felli and Merlo (2006) study the interaction between
voting and lobbying on a unidimensional setting where the elected politician
can choose which lobbies to receive contributions from. They show an ef-
fect of lobbying on policies. Glaeser et al. (2005) argue that Republicans
and Democrats have become increasingly extremist on the religious issue,
to induce their core constituencies to show up and vote, and that is caused
by a growing religious sentiment in the US. Reading this fact through the
lenses of our model we should see an effect of lobbying on non moral related
issues in these last years. It is indeed true that for example the Buffet rule
was supported by the 72 % of Americans, 53 % among Republicans 5. Still
it was not approved by the Congress. Krasa and Polborn (2010) created
a multidimensional binary model with salient issues. They argue that pol-
icy spaces, formed by finite and especially binary choices on each issue, are
common in electoral campaigns and deliver more realistic results. In their
setting candidates start with some fixed positions on some dimensions and
fight for swing voters on others, where they are flexible. Besley and Coate
(2008) analyze the positive role of citizens’ initiatives or referenda, in order
to bring implemented policies closer to the will of the majority. The reasons
why, even if a Condorcet winner policy in all dimensions exists, it could not
be implemented, are that in all elections issues are bundled together. They
identify three main channels: a divergence between the elite of a party and
the popular opinion on non salient issues, a group of voters who vote as a
single issue voter on a minority view, and when a minority view is supported
by an interest group on a non salient issue. The third case is the one we
focus on in this paper. Two papers that consider the salience of issues are
5http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/16/cnn-poll-7-out-of-10-support-
buffett-rule/
5
Roemer (1998) and Lee and Roemer (2006). Roemer (1998) investigates with
a theoretical model why a redistributive political party could be forced to
propose a low tax rate, in a world with two issues (tax policy and religion), if
the religious dimension becomes very salient. Lee and Roemer (2006) study
empirically how racism among voters contributed to reduce the income tax
rate in the US in the period 1976-1992. While the reasoning behind Roemer
(1998) relies on a specific distribution of voters in the policy space, in partic-
ular on the presence of a large poor racist part of the population, the results
of our model explain the same phenomenon analyzed by Roemer (1998) and
are valid for any distribution of citizens in the policy space.
Finally there is an important part of the political economy literature
dedicated to the empirical study of the dimensions of the political space and
the bliss points of MPs. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) use data on the roll call
voting on the US House and Senate to test the program NOMINATE on the
positions of MPs in a unidimensional model. Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
and Poole and Rosenthal (2001) integrate this initial work with a dynamic
program, testing for the number of dimensions of the political space of MPs.
They find that the multidimensionality of the policy space can be reduced
to 2. Hix et al. (2006) test the same statistical model on the European
Parliament. The concept of policy space in our model is different from the
political space of Poole and Rosenthanl. They collapse the policy space in a
2-dimensional political space because most of the times MPs vote following
their party direction on the conservative-liberal axis, while on other votes
their behavior can be regrouped following the North-South US axis. The
number of dimensions is thus related to the number of opposite parliamentary
blocks that appear in different votes. Instead the dimensions of the policy
space in our model refer to different issues that affect voters. We do not
model parliamentary voting and assume a single politician implements a
multidimensional policy when she is elected.
3 The Model
The K−dimensional policy space is denoted by D = [0, 1]K . The set of
citizens is denoted by N = {1, ...,M}, with M even. Citizen i ∈ N has the
following utility function:
U(q, i) =
K∑
k=1
λiku(qk, q
i
k) + ρy
i, (1)
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where qk is the kth element of the vector policy q ∈ D. u(qk, qik) is strictly
concave in qk, single-peaked and symmetric around q
i
k. q
i is citizen i’s bliss
point. ρ measures the intensity of citizen’s preferences over money with
respect to policy. λik ≥ 0 is the weight given by citizen i to dimension or
issue k. For every M , fM is the step density function that describes the
distribution of the M voters’ bliss points in the policy space. FM is the
cumulative induced measure function of fM . We assume that FM converges
in distribution to a cumulative function F . The Radon-Nikodym derivative
of F is f , i.e. F (A) =
∫
A
fdµ,A ⊂ D, and µ is the Lebesgue meausure in
RK . We also assume that f > 0 almost everywhere, that means that the
population of citizens is “dense” in the policy space.
Lobbies have a similar utility function. For simplicity we assume that
there is just one lobby for each dimension:
V (q, k) = µku(qk, q
L
k ) + y
L
k , (2)
where µk is an idiosyncratic parameter for every lobby. µk is the relative
intensity of lobby’s preferences for policy with respect to money. For the
same utility gain a lobby with higher µk is willing to pay more. We normalize
transfers to be zero
∫
S
yidi+
∑K
k=1 y
L
k = 0.
3.1 Uncertainty about voters’ preferences
Some parts of our analysis will be restricted to K = 2. In this setting we will
assume that there are only two types of citizens: type 1 is characterized by
weights (1, λ12), type 2 by (1, λ
2
2), where λ
1
2 < λ
2
2, meaning that type 1 citizens
weight more dimension 1 with respect to type 2 citizens. The types set is
denoted by T = {1, 2}. Citizens of type 1 and 2 have the same distribution f
on the policy space. The type of each citizen is not known at the beginning,
there is a common prior: each citizen has probability p of being of type 1
and probability 1 − p of being of type 2. We parameterize λ12 = θη and
λ22 = (2 − θ)η, θ < 1, where η = 1/2(λ12 + λ22) is the arithmetic average
of the two parameters. Uncertainty about types of voters makes this game
Bayesian.
3.2 Entry of candidates
Each citizen can enter as a candidate paying a small cost c. We denote by
σ(i, t) : S × T → {0, 1} the decision of type t citizen i, σ(i, t) = 1 indicates
(i, t)’s decision to enter as a candidate, while if σ(i, t) = 0 (i, t) will stay out.
We define C(σ) = {i ∈ S : ∃t such that σ(i, t) = 1} the set of candidates for
7
every entry function σ. If no one runs for office we assume that a default
policy qsq ∈ [0, 1]K is implemented.
3.3 Voting
Every citizen has one vote to cast for one of the candidates in C(σ). Given
C(σ) each citizen simultaneously decides to cast a vote for a candidate or
abstain. Let γ(i) citizen i’s choice, if γ(i) = e citizen i casts a vote for
candidate e ∈ C(σ), if γ(i) = 0 she abstains. Each citizen makes her decision
maximizing her expected utility, given the choice of other voters. Voters are
strategic. The candidate that gets more votes is elected. If two or more
candidates tie the winner is selected with equal probability among all the
tying candidates. The voting subgame is also Bayesian, because the voters’
types are private information.
3.4 Lobbying
Lobbies offer the winning candidate binding contracts contingent to the fu-
ture implemented policy. The contribution, or willingness to pay, offered by
lobby k to politician P for a policy q is defined as follows:
w(qk, k) = µk[u(qk, q
L
k )− u(qPk , qLk )], (3)
which is the utility gain lobby k gets if policy q is implemented instead of
policy qP . The elected politician receives contributions from all the lobbies
and chooses q∗ maximizing her utility after lobbying:
q∗ = arg max
q∈D
K∑
k=1
λPk u(qk, q
P
k ) + ρ
K∑
k=1
µk[u(qk, q
L
k )− u(qPk , qLk )]. (4)
Summarizing the timing of the game is the following:
1. citizens simultaneously decide to enter as candidates,
2. voters simultaneously vote for a candidate or abstain,
3. lobbies offer contributions to the winning candidate,
4. the elected politician implements a policy.
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In order to have closed form solutions we assume the concave function u(x, y)
takes the following form:
u(x, y) = − (x− y)2
We will make use also of the matrix notation:
qi =
 q
i
1
...
qiK
 ,
Λi =

λi1 0 · · · 0
0 λi2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · λiK
 ,
M =

µ1 0 · · · 0
0 µ2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · µK
 .
4 Results
We proceed backwards to solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
multistage game. We start from the last stage: lobbying and the implemen-
tation of a policy by the elected politician. We keep K unspecified in this
subgame, and restrict to K = 2 in the voting subgame.
4.1 Equilibria in the lobbying subgame
After elections are over one candidate P becomes the politician and, aware
of the lobbying contributions, decides which policy q∗ to implement.
Lemma 1 The elected politician P implements the following policy:
q∗P =
(
ΛP + ρM
)−1 (
ΛP qP + ρMqL
)
. (5)
The equilibrium policy is unique, given the entry function σ, and voting de-
cision γ.
If ΛP = Λ is common for all citizens the implemented policy is:
q∗P = (Λ+ ρM)−1
(
ΛqP + ρMqL
)
. (6)
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The proof is presented in the appendix.
The politician implements a policy which is a convex combination of her
most preferred policy and the most preferred policy of the lobbies, in each
dimension. If the ranking Λ is the same for every citizen then in dimension
j the weights are
λj
λj+ρµj
and
ρµj
λj+ρµj
.
Figure 1: Divergence between A bliss point and A impl policy. λA2 >> λ
A
1
The salience of each dimension λj interacts with ρ and µj to determine the
implemented policy. In the following sections the superscript P is dropped
from q∗, when there is no confusion about the identity of the politician. We
now perform some comparative statics.
If there is a common ranking Λ we define q∗(λj), where we underline the
dependence of the equilibrium policy q∗ on the common salience of issue j.
q∗(λoj) and q
∗(λlj) are then two equilibrium policies that arise with the same
set of parameters λi 6=j,M, ρ, c, qi, apart from λj. It is important to notice
that q∗(λj) could not be an equilibrium for some λj > 0.
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Proposition 1 Given a politician with bliss point qP , and λij, λ
l
j > 0, if
q∗(λij) and q
∗(λlj) are both equilibria, then:
λij < λ
l
j =⇒ |q∗j (λij)− qLj | < |q∗j (λlj)− qLj |. (7)
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If an issue is less salient it is easier for the lobby in that dimension to move
the implemented policy closer to its bliss point.
With abuse of notation we define q∗(µj), where the equilibrium imple-
mented policy now depends on µj, the preference for policy with respect to
money of lobby j. The other parameters are fixed.
Proposition 2 Given µij, µ
l
j > 0, if q
∗(µij) and q
∗(µlj) are both equilibria,
then:
µij < µ
l
j =⇒ |q∗j (µij)− qLj | > |q∗j (µlj)− qLj |. (8)
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If a lobby has stronger preferences for policy with respect to money in a
dimension, the implemented policy is closer to the lobby’s bliss point.
Now we restrict to K = 2 and we use the parametrization of λ12 and λ
2
2.
We define q∗(η) as before. We state the following:
Proposition 3 Given ηi, ηl > 0, if q∗(ηi) and q∗(ηl) are both equilibria, then:
ηi < ηl =⇒ |q∗P2 (ηi)− qL2 | < |q∗P2 (ηl)− qL2 |, (9)
for a politician P of type 1 or 2.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If a dimension is less salient for all types of voters in the population the
lobby obtains a higher utility gain from the policy implemented by the elected
candidate. Proposition 1 and 3 say that a lobby can “move” the policy maker
closer to its bliss point if the issue on which the interest group is lobbying is
less salient for all citizens. These comparative statics confirm our prediction:
in this model the elected politician in the most salient dimensions implements
a policy closer to her own bliss point, in less salient issues she pleases lobbies.
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4.2 Voting Equilibrium
In the voting equilibrium we rule out weakly dominated strategies, as in
Besley and Coate (1997). We concentrate our attention on two-candidate
equilibria. If in the entry stage equilibrium the two types of the same citizen
i take different actions, for example type A of citizen i enters as a candidate
and type 2 does not, voters correctly predict that they are facing type A of
candidate i and they behave accordingly. If the two types of citizen i take
the same action, voters use the prior on the types to compute the expected
implemented policy. Consequently in this section we identify the candidates
with the policies voters think they will implement, anticipating also the effect
of lobbying. We call them candidates’ expected policies.
If there is just one type of voters and two candidates, C(σ) = {A,B},
given that in this situation strategic voting implies sincere voting, to compute
the voting equilibrium we partition the policy space, computing for each can-
didate c ∈ C(σ) the subsetN(c) = {qv ∈ D|v ∈ N, c = arg maxP∈C(σ) u(q∗P , v)},
where q∗P is candidate P ’s expected policy. The winning candidate is P =
arg maxc∈C(σ) FM(N(c)).
With just one type of voters the partition of the policy space D is carried
through separating hyperplanes: if λ1 = λ2 the hyperplane is orthogonal to
the segment connecting the expected policies of the two candidates and cuts
it in half. If λ1 6= λ2 the hyperplane cuts in half the segment connecting the
two candidates’ policies and “leans” towards the more important dimension.
Indeed if the expected policies of candidates A and B are respectively (xA, yA)
and (xB, yB) the derivative of the separating hyperplane is
λ1(xB−xA)
λ2(yA−yB) . We
define such hyperplane hλ1λ2 . It is worth noticing that the angle between
the orthogonal hyperplane and the “leaning” one depends not only on the
relative weights but also on the positions of the two candidates. Indeed if
the two candidates have the same positions on one of the two issues, that is
either xA = xB or yA = yB the orthogonal and the “leaning” hyperplanes
coincide.
12
Figure 2: A separating hyperplane “leaning” towards dimension 1
With two types of voters there is uncertainty about the number of citizens
who vote for a candidate, because depending on their type, they could vote for
one or another candidate. The Law of Large Numbers helps us with M →∞,
indeed the probability distribution of voters for a candidate is degenerate,
when the number of voters is infinite. Let us make an example with K = 2
and two types of voters: if the entry stage delivered two candidates, we will
have the following partition of the policy space:
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Figure 3: Partition of the policy space with 2 types of voters
The dots A and B represent candidates A and B’s expected policies. The
hyperplanes h1λ12 and h1λ22 partition the policy space in 4 areas. As we can see
there are two areas, W and Y , where the two types of same citizen vote for
the same candidate. There are other two areas, X and Z, where the two types
vote for different candidates. In area X every citizen votes with probability p
for A and with probability 1−p for B. In area Y the converse is true. Citizens
in this areas can be somehow called swing voters, because the beneficiary of
their vote is not known to other citizens and the candidates. Swing voters are
not necessarily moderate, so their preferred policy could be not “in between”
the candidates’ expected policies. In area X we are interested to know the
probability density function of the proportion of citizens voting for A, which
is equivalent to compute the density of the variable
∑n
i=1
Xi
n
for n → ∞,
where Xi is the Bernoullian variable taking value 1 if citizen i with bliss
point qi ∈ X is of type 1. For the law of Large Numbers we know that the
limit converges almost surely to the expected value E(X1) = E(X2) = ... = p.
We then know that the event “of all citizens with bliss point in X p of them
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vote for A” has probability 1. Candidate A receives the following votes:∫
W
f(x)dx+ p
∫
X
f(x)dx+ (1− p)
∫
Z
f(x)dx,
while candidate B receives:∫
Y
f(x)dx+ p
∫
Z
f(x)dx+ (1− p)
∫
X
f(x)dx.
Next follow lemmas that describe the subgame equilibria in the voting stage.
We will define a “winning candidate” a candidate who has a positive proba-
bility of winning or tying. When we will say that voters “face” a certain set
of candidates, we refer to the situation of having that set of candidates in
the voting stage. In the next section it will be clear that there are equilibria
of the game, in which the set of citizens that choose to enter as candidates is
larger than the set of candidates that get to the voting stage, because some
of these candidates will not be drawn by Nature.
Lemma 2 If there is an infinite number of voters, and voters face two can-
didates A and B, a necessary and sufficient condition such that one of them
does not lose with certainty is the following:∫
W
f(x)dx+p
∫
X
f(x)dx+(1−p)
∫
Z
f(x)dx =
∫
Y
f(x)dx+p
∫
Z
f(x)dx+(1−p)
∫
X
f(x)dx,
(10)
where (W,X, Y, Z) result from the partition of the space by two separating
hyperplanes, h1,λ12 and h1,λ22. In W citizens of both types vote for A, in Y
citizens of both types vote for B, in X type 1 citizens vote for A and type
2 citizens vote for B and the converse in Y . If condition 10 is satisfied
candidates tie.
If the candidates’ expected policies q∗A and q∗B are such that q∗Ai = q
∗B
i
for either i ∈ {1, 2} h1,λ12 and h1,λ22 coincide and equation 10 becomes:∫
W
f(x)dx =
∫
Y
f(x)dx. (11)
Lemma 3 For every  > 0 there exists M, such that if the number of citizens
M satisfies M > M, if condition 10 is satisfied and voters face candidate
A and B, the probability that candidate A wins, PWA , satisfies the following
inequality: ∣∣∣∣PWA − 12
∣∣∣∣ < . (12)
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The probability that candidate A loses, PLA , satisfies the following inequality:∣∣∣∣PLA − 12
∣∣∣∣ < . (13)
The probability that candidate A ties, P TA , satisfies the following inequality:
PLA < . (14)
Under the same conditions but condition 10, for one candidate P among
{A,B} the probability of winning PWP satisfies the following inequality:∣∣PWP − 1∣∣ < . (15)
The proof is presented in the appendix. Lemma 2 says that, with an infinite
number of voters, a necessary condition for a candidate not to lose for sure in
the voting subgame is that the two candidates split in half the costituency.
Hence the candidates tie. Lemma 3 says that, for a finite but high M ,
under condition 10 the probability of winning and losing approximates one
half, that gives to each candidate the same payoff of tying. If condition
10 is not satisfed one candidate loses with a probability that approximates
one. Therefore with a high but finite number of voters M , only the subgame
equilibria that exist for an infinite number of voters survive. We will therefore
restrict our analysis of equilibria to the ones with an infinite number of voters.
The next lemmas state conditions about the entry of a third candidate.
Lemma 4 There are no subgame voting equilibria, where voters face 3 can-
didates such that all three candidates have a positive probability of winning
or tying.
The proof of lemma 4 is given in Besley and Coate (1997). Indeed if the
population of voters is dense in the policy space, that is our case, a subgame
equilibrium where three candidates have a positive probability of winning
cannot exist because a voter that is nearly indifferent between two candidates
will rather deviate and vote for her second preferred candidate to make him
win with probability one.
Lemma 5 There is a voting subgame where citizens face 2 candidates whose
expected implemented policies satisfy condition 10, and another candidate for
whom it does not, such that the third candidate loses with certainty.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
While lemma 4 states that there cannot be subgame equilibria with 3 winning
candidates, lemma 5 says that subgame equilibria with 2 winning candidates
exist.
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4.3 Entry Equilibrium
To characterize a two-candidate equilibrium we need to study the Bayesian
nature of the entry stage. We know that a necessary condition for a two
tying candidate equilibrium is given by equation 10. In equation 10 the four
areas are defined by the hyperplanes, which are based on the candidates’
expected policies. Let us define σ∗ the equilibrium entry function. If for all
i ∈ C(σ∗) σ∗(i, 1) = σ∗(i, 2) the entry equilibrium is defined totally pooling.
If for all i ∈ C(σ∗) σ∗(i, 1) 6= σ∗(i, 2) the entry equilibrium is defined totally
separating. Otherwise we call the entry equilibrium pooling. If the entry
equilibrium is totally separating, the expected policies are the implemented
policies, if the entry equilibrium is totally pooling, the expected policies are
the expected implemented policies. In this section with abuse of notation
we refer to q∗it as the policy implemented by type t candidate i if she were
elected, and to Pt if nature has drawn type t for candidate P . We refer
also to the Euclidean distance in R2 between x and y as |x− y|. We denote
−t as the non t type. When there are only two candidates we denote −P
as the non P candidate. There is an infinite amount of entry equilibria
given by the positions of the candidates. In a game without uncertainty
about the types of candidates, and without uncertainty about the voting
behavior, a necessary condition for a 2 candidates equilibrium is that the 2
candidates tie. Otherwise one candidate would lose for sure and would rather
not enter and save c. Moreover when the population of strategic voters is
dense in the policy space Besley and Coate (1997) prove that there cannot be
equilibria with more than 2 candidates. In our game the uncertainty about
voting behavior is solved with the law of large number. For what concerns
uncertainty about the types of candidates, if we have a pooling equilibrium
we know that in the voting stage citizens will face 2 candidates, even though
they do not know their identity. In this case the expected implemented
policies of the candidates must split the electorate evenly. Instead, if we
have a separating equilibrium, it could be that the type that is supposed to
enter of a certain candidate is not drawn by Nature. Therefore citizens in
the voting stage would face only one candidate. This changes the incentives
to enter as a candidate, because a candidate that would lose against its
opponent could find convenient to enter, indeed with some probability the
other candidate is not drawn and she wins with certainty. Consequently
there will be separating equilibria with 2 tying candidates, and with 2 non
tying candidates. The same reasoning opens the way to separating equilibria
with more than 2 candidates.
In the next theorems we state the conditions such that 2 candidates find
convenient to enter. We define the following quantity:
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d(q, r) :=
√
(q1 − r1)2 + (q2 − r2)2, where r, q are 2-dimensional vectors. d is
the euclidean distance.
Condition 1 (strong non proximity) A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) =
{A,B}, satisfies strong non proximity if the following conditions are satisfied:
1
2
[
U(q∗At , At)− U(q¯B, At) + p(1− p)d2(q∗Bs , q∗B−s)
]
> c, (16)
1
2
[
U(q∗Bs , Bs)− U(q¯A, Bs) + p(1− p)d2(q∗Bs , q∗B−s)
]
> c,
1
2
[
U(q∗A−t , A−t)− U(q¯B, A−t) + p(1− p)d2(q∗At , q∗A−t)
]
> c,
1
2
[
U(q∗B−s , B−s)− U(q¯A, B−s) + p(1− p)d2(q∗At , q∗A−t)
]
> c,
where U(q∗i, i) includes the lobbies’ contribution.
Condition 2 (non proximity) A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) = {At, Bs},
satisfies non proximity if the following conditions are satisfied:(
1− ps
2
)
U(q∗At , At)− ps
2
U(q∗Bs , At) > c+ (1− ps)U(qsq, At), (17)(
1− pt
2
)
U(q∗Bs , Bs)− ps
2
U(q∗At , Bs) > c+ (1− pt)U(qsq, Bs),(
1− ps
2
)
U(q∗A−t , A−t)− ps
2
U(q∗Bs , A−t) < c+ (1− ps)U(qsq, A−t),(
1− pt
2
)
U(q∗B−s , B−s)− ps
2
U(q∗At , B−s) < c+ (1− pt)U(qsq, B−s),
and for all citizens r ∈ N , that would win with certainty pairwise against
either At or Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ptps)U(q∗r, r) < c+pt(1−ps)U(q∗At , r)+ps(1−pt)U(q∗Bs , r)+(1−ps)(1−pt)U(qsq, r),
(18)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would lose with certainty pairwise against both At
or Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ps)(1− pt)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (19)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would lose with certainty against At and win
against Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− pt)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− pt)psU(q∗Bs , r) + (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (20)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would win with certainty against At and lose
against Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ps)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− ps)ptU(q∗At , r) + (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (21)
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where pt and ps are the prior probabilities respectively of types t and s, and
U(q∗i, i) includes the lobbies’ contribution.
Theorem 1 (totally pooling) A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) = {A,B},
exists and is totally pooling if and only if condition 1 is satisfied and the two
expected implemented policies q¯A = pq∗A1 +(1−p)q∗A2 and q¯B = pq∗B1 +(1−
p)q∗B2 generate hyperplanes h1,λ12 and h1,λ22 that satisfy equation 10.
Theorem 1 says that a sufficient condition for a two-candidate totally
pooling equilibrium is that the expected implemented policies split in half
the electorate. All types of candidates A and B find profitable to enter
because they have 1/2 probability to win and for condition 1 they are better
off than letting the other candidate win.
Theorem 2 (totally separating) A two tying candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) =
{At, Bs}, exists and is totally separating if condition 2 is satisfied and the two
policies q∗At and q∗Bs generate hyperplanes h1,λ12 and h1,λ22 that satisfy equa-
tion 10.
Theorem 2 says that a sufficient condition for a two-candidate totally sep-
arating equilibrium is that nature selects types whose implemented policies
split in half the constituency. Moreover for condition 2 only one type per
candidate must find convenient to enter.
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Figure 4: Positions of a 2 candidates totally pooling equilibrium
With abuse of notation we define the implemented policy q∗(ρ) in equilib-
rium as depending on the parameter ρ, the preference for money of citizens,
while keeping all other parameters constant.
Proposition 4 In totally pooling equilibria the interest groups’ lobbying has
an effect on the implemented policy, that is
q∗(ρ) 6= q∗(0),
for every ρ > 0.
The entry equilibrium analysis delivers several results: first of all, dif-
ferently from Besley and Coate (1997) we have an effect of lobbying on im-
plemented policies if the equilibrium is totally pooling. Indeed in a totally
pooling entry equilibrium both types of the same candidate enter, voters do
no know which type they face so they vote on expected policies. Depending
on the type of candidate realized, they will have offset either too much or too
little. Therefore lobbying can matter for implemented policies, and in our
model the channel is the incomplete information about general salient issues
in the electoral campaign. The difference between a totally pooling and a
totally separating equilibrium is that in the latter the candidates entering
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are signalling their type, not only with their action of entering, but also with
the opponent’s action.
4.4 3 candidates equilibrium
Here we specify the conditions for a 3 candidates equilibrium. There were no
3 candidates equilibria in Besley and Coate (1997). A necessary condition
to have 3 candidates equilibria in the setting of Besley and Coate (1997) is
that all candidates tie in the voting stage. But with strategic voting and
with a high number of citizens ”dense” in the policy space, all voters that
are nearly indifferent between their most liked candidate and the second one,
will deviate and vote for the second preferred one to make this candidate win
with certainty.
In our model instead the uncertainty about citizens’ salience transmits to
uncertainty about voting behavior, about candidates’ implemented policies,
and, in a separating equilibrium, about candidates’ entry. Indeed, in a sepa-
rating equilibrium, the entry conditions for a candidate are satisfied for only
one type. If Nature extracts the other type, it will not enter. Therefore this
uncertainty about entry of candidates gives room to separating equilibria
with more than 2 candidates, where some candidates enter hoping that at
least one of the two tying candidates is not extracted by Nature.
The next theorem states the necessary and sufficient conditions for a 3 can-
didates equilibrium, where there are two candidates who tie in the voting
stage, and a “third candidate” who would lose with certainty if all 3 candi-
dates enter, but wins pairwise against both other candidates.
Theorem 3 A 3 candidates equilibrium, with candidates (At, Bs, Cl) exists
if At and Bs implemented policies q
∗At and q∗Bs generate hyperplanes that
satisfy equation 10, and the following conditions are satisfied:[pj
2
+ (1− pj)(1− pl)
]
U(q∗Pi , Pi) +
[pj
2
− (1− pl)pj
]
U(q∗−Pj , Pi) >
c+ pjplU(q
∗Cl , Pi) + (1− pl)(1− pj)U(qsq, Pi),(22)[pj
2
+ (1− pj)(1− pl)
]
U(q∗P−i , P−i) +
[pj
2
− (1− pl)pj
]
U(q∗−Pj , P−i) <
c+ pjplU(q
∗Cl , P−i) + (1− pl)(1− pj)U(qsq, P−i),(23)
for i, j ∈ {t, s} and Pi ∈ {At, Bs}, where pj is the probability of type j.
The following conditions must be satisfied for a candidate Cl, who would win
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with certainty pairwise against both At and Bs:
(1− ptps)U(q∗Cl , Cl) > c+ pt(1− ps)U(q∗At , Cl) +
ps(1− pt)U(q∗Bs , Cl) + (1− pt)(1− ps)U(qsq, Cl), (24)
(1− ptps)U(q∗C−l , C−l) < c+ pt(1− ps)U(q∗At , C−l) +
ps(1− pt)U(q∗Bs , C−l) + (1− pt)(1− ps)U(qsq, C−l). (25)
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would win
pairwise against both At and Bs, and would lose against Cl:
(1− ptps)(1− pl)U(q∗r, r) < c+ pt(1− ps)(1− pl)U(q∗At , r) +
ps(1− pt)(1− pl)U(q∗Bs , r) + (1− pt)(1− ps)(1− pl)U(qsq, r). (26)
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would win
pairwise against At and Bs and Cl:
(1− ptps)U(q∗r, r) < c+ pt(1− ps)(1− pl)U(q∗At , r) +
ps(1− pt)(1− pl)U(q∗Bs , r) + plU(q∗Pl , r)(1− pt)(1− ps)(1− pl)U(qsq, r).(27)
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would win
pairwise against i, and would lose against either j or Cl:
(1− pj)(1− pl)U(q∗r, r) < c+
(1− pj)(1− pl)piU(q∗i, r) + (1− pi)(1− pj)(1− pl)U(qsq, r), (28)
for i, j ∈ {At, Bs}.
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would win
pairwise against i and Cl, and would lose against j:
(1− pj)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− pj)(1− pl)piU(q∗i, r) +
(1− pj)plU(q∗Cl , r) + (1− pi)(1− pj)(1− pl)U(qsq, r), (29)
for i, j ∈ {At, Bs}.
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would lose
pairwise against At, Bs and win against Cl:
(1− pt)(1− ps)U(q∗r, r) < c+
(1− pt)(1− ps)plU(q∗Cl , r) + (1− pt)(1− ps)(1− pl)U(qsq, r). (30)
The following condition must be satisfied for a citizen r, who would lose
pairwise against At, Bs and Cl:
(1− pt)(1− ps)(1− pl)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− pt)(1− ps)(1− pl)U(qsq, r). (31)
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5 Endogenizing lobbying
We present here an extension of the model where citizens can interact directly
with lobbies, giving them monetary contributions in order to increase their
power and thus obtain a more favorable implemented policy.
We assume that preference intensity for policy with respect to money and
the salience of issues are idiosyncratic, i.e. ρi and λij for citizen i. We assume
also that there can be more than one lobby for every political dimension.
Contribution to lobbies is implemented after elections are over. To simplify
the analysis we also assume that after elections and before contribution takes
place the type of each citizen is revealed. If a subset R ⊂ N of citizens
contributes to lobby k her relative intensity for policy with respect to money
becomes:
µLk := b
L
k +
√
yk, (32)
where yk :=
∑
i∈R y
i
k, y
i
k is the monetary contribution of citizen i to lobby k,
and bLk is a positive constant
6. We also define y−ik :=
∑
j∈R,j 6=i y
j
k.
If citizen i contributes yi =
∑K
k=1 y
i
k ≥ 0 to lobbying her utility becomes:
U(q, i) =
K∑
k=1
λiku(qk, q
i
k)− ρiyi,
Citizens contribute after elections are over and before lobbies offer their con-
tribution schedules to the elected politician.
If a citizen contributes yik to lobby k the interest group increases its prefer-
ences for the policy, this has a positive effect on the contribution schedule
offered to the politician and thus on q∗P , moving it closer to the bliss point
of the lobby.
Let us define
yMk (ρ, qk, λk) :=
[
ρPλPk λk(qk − q∗k)(qLk − qPk )
ρ(λPk + ρ
PµLk )
2
]2
.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium only a subset Rk ⊂ N donates to lobby k.
Citizen i belongs to Rk if and only if (q
i
k− q∗k)(qLk − qPk ) ≥ 0 and (ρi, qik, λik) ∈
6We assume that citizens’ monetary contribution affects µLk and thus the willingness to
pay w with a decreasing margin, the same results would be obtained if we assume that the
contribution increases linearly w and the citizen’s monetary cost is convex. The drawback
of this last and more natural formulation is that for internal coherence also the lobby’s
monetary cost would need to be convex, w would then be concave in the lobby’s utility
and the implemented policy q∗ would need to be recomputed.
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arg max yMk . The equilibrium contribution to lobby k is yk = maxρ,qk,λk y
M
k
7.
The reason why only a subset of all citizens donate to lobbying is that
moderate citizens free ride on the more extreme. The equilibrium contribu-
tions are not unique, e.g. every vector of positive individual contributions yik
such that
∑
i∈Rk y
i
k = yk is an equilibrium.
Next we perform brief comparative statics on the equilibrium total con-
tribution yk to lobby k, that take into account that yk is not in a closed
form solution, because also q∗k and µ
L
k depend on yk. First of all condi-
tion (qik − q∗k)(qLk − qPk ) ≥ 0 implies that citizens and lobbies are “on the
same side” with respect to the implemented policy, otherwise the contribu-
tion from citizen i to lobby k is zero. Let us assume that (qik − q∗k) > 0
and (qLk − qPk ) > 0. Interestingly the contribution yk depends positively,
under some conditions, on the distance (qLk − qPk ). Indeed moving qLk fur-
ther from qPk increases the contribution yk if (q
i
k − q∗k) remains positive and
qik− q∗k−ρPµLk /(λPk +ρPµLk )(qLk − qPk ) > 0, which is always satisfied if ρPµLk is
relatively small. Under this condition the more extreme is a lobby the more
contributions it will receive. Also the term (qik − q∗k) tells us that the further
is the citizen’s bliss point from the implemented policy the more she con-
tributes to lobbying. yk depends also positively on λ
i
k and negatively on ρ
i
as expected. Thus if λik is low for many citizens there will be a counteracting
effect with respect to the one we focused in proposition 1, indeed the lobby
can move the policy closer to her bliss point because citizens do not care a lot
about that topic, but they will also contribute less to lobbying, giving her less
power. If instead the salience of an issue is high for the whole population the
lobby will receive contributions but the politician will not move too much the
implemented policy in the direction of the lobby because citizens care about
it. Therefore the capability of a lobby to move the implemented policy close
to her position depends on the existence of a small group of individuals that
consider an issue very salient, while the majority of citizens does not.
If we have n lobbies in dimension k where each lobby is denoted by jk
the implemented policy in equilibrium is:
q∗Pk =
λPk q
P
k + ρ
P
∑n
j=1 µ
j
kq
j
k
λPk + ρ
P
∑n
j=1 µ
j
k
, (33)
so in each dimension the implemented policy is a convex combination of the
bliss point of the politician and that of lobbies that operate on that issue.
7A similar result would be obtained defining µLk := b
L
k + φ(yk), where φ(·) is a concave
function. The equilibrium contribution would be yk = (φ
′
)−1
(
ρi(λPk +ρ
PµLk )
2
2ρPλPk λ
i
k(q
i
k−q∗k)(qLk−qPk )
)
.
The comparative statics bring the same results as with φ(·) = √·.
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The next condition applies only to individuals who donate in equilibrium.
The equilibrium contribution yijk of citizen i to lobby j
k satisfies:
√
yjk =
λik(q
i
k − q∗k)ρP [λPk (qLjk − qPk ) + ρP
∑n
s=1 µ
s
k(q
Lj
k − qLsk )]
ρi(λPk + ρ
P
∑n
s=1 µ
s
k)
2
(34)
if the numerator is positive.
The same reasoning that was applied to the equilibrium contributions with
one lobby per issue tells us that only individuals for which the RHS of equa-
tion 34 is the highest donate. The same comparative statics results with one
lobby apply with more than one. Interestingly with more than one lobby
citizens contribute mostly and under some conditions ONLY to the most
extreme lobby. Indeed let us consider the case of just two lobbies 1 and 2,
where qPk < q
1
k < q
2
k. If contributing only to lobby 2 implies q
1
k < q
∗
k < q
i
k,
then in equilibrium citizen i does not contribute to lobby 1. These results
about extremism are given by the fact that the lobby contribution schedule
is a function increasing in the distance between the politician bliss point and
the lobby one. The result does not always hold, indeed if the stated condition
is not valid citizen i could find profitable to contribute to lobby 1, because
the contribution function
√· is concave, with a decreasing marginal return.
The previous comparative statics take into account that yijk is not in a closed
form solution.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a voting model where citizens candidates have a ranking
over issues. After elections unidimensional lobbies intervene in order to influ-
ence the politician. They offer contributions contingent to the implemented
policy. We find that interest groups that lobby on dimensions that are less
salient are able to move the implemented policy further from the bliss point
of the politician and closer to their own with respect to interest groups that
intervene in more salient issues.
When studying the entry and voting equilibria of the model, we reduce the
political dimensions to two and add a source of information incompleteness.
Voters are of two different types: type 1 gives less importance to the second
issue with respect to type 2. Depending on the position of candidates, we
can have 2-candidates pooling or separating equilibria. Pooling equilibria are
particularly interesting, because differently from Besley and Coate (2001),
we have an effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. Indeed, citizens in
pooling equilibria do not know the candidate’s type and vote based on the
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expected value of the implemented policy. In this way they will offset too
much or too little the work of lobbies.
Separating equilibria deliver novel results because they open the way to
equilibria with three candidates, which were excluded in the citizen candidate
model with strategic and dense voters of Besley and Coate (1997). In our
setting there can be equilibria where for each of 2 candidates there is only one
type that has an incentive to enter, and there is a third candidate that enters
even though he would be a sure loser against both other candidates. The
third candidate enters hoping that one of the two or both other candidates
are not drawn by Nature.
Moreover, in equilibrium there are citizens with the same most preferred
policy that vote for different candidates if they are of different types. This
result captures the real paradox of voters that have the same political views,
but end up supporting different candidates, because they have dissimilar
opinions on what is the most important political issue.
An extension of the model provides citizens with the possibility of giv-
ing monetary contributions to interest groups, partly endogenizing lobbying.
Contributions increase the power of the lobby and its ability to move the
implemented policy towards its bliss point. With more than one lobby per
issue, we find that, under some conditions, only the most extreme lobbies
receive contributions, because the willingness to pay of the lobby increases
with the distance between the politician’s bliss point and the lobby’s one.
Moreover the effectiveness of a lobby is maximized when the salience of an
issue is low for the general population and high for a small group of citizens.
Further research can be done on the same topic. Instead of taking as
exogenous the citizens’ ranking of issues, it would be interesting to consider
a politician or a lobby that can manipulate salience through advertising.
A politician would like to receive contributions from lobbies with a higher
willingness to pay, thus she could try to lower the salience of issues on which
these lobbies operate. Thus the interaction of lobbying after elections and
the manipulation before could show that in equilibrium interest groups can
be more successful in the political dimensions that were ex ante more relevant
for citizens.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: the elected politician P maximizes the utility function
in 4, the FOC is: −2λPk (xk − xPk )− 2ρµk(qk − qLk ) = 0 which put in a matrix
form brings the result in lemma 1. The 2nd order conditions are guaranteed
by the concavity of the quadratic function u.
Proof of Proposition 1: we assume that there is a continuum of set of
parameters ℘λsj such that for each λi ≥ 0 q∗Pλij is an equilibrium. q
∗P
λj
is a con-
tinuous and differentiable function of λj, with both properties guaranteed by
lemma 1. Then we can compute the derivative ∂
∂λj
|q∗Pλj ,j−qLj | =
ρµj |qPj −qLj |
(λj+ρµj)2
> 0.
The sign of the derivative proves proposition 1 for all λij, λ
l
j such that q
∗P
λij
, q∗P
λlj
are equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 2: we assume that for all µj ∈ [0, 1] q∗Pµj is an
equilibrium. q∗Pµj is a continuous and differentiable function of µj, with both
properties guaranteed by lemma 1. Then we can compute the derivative
∂
∂µj
|q∗Pµj ,j − qLj | = −
λPj ρ|qPj −qLj |
(λj+ρµj)2
< 0. The sign of the derivative proves proposi-
tion 2 for all µij, µ
l
j such that q
∗P
µij
, q∗P
µlj
are equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3: we assume that for all η ≥ 0 q∗Pη is an equi-
librium. q∗Pη is a continuous and differentiable function of η, with both prop-
erties guaranteed by lemma 1. We take P of type 1. Then we can compute
the derivative ∂
∂η
|q∗η,2 − qL2 | = ∂∂η θη|q
P
2 −qL2 |
θη+ρµ2
=
θρµ2|qP2 −qL2 |
(θη+ρµ2)2
> 0. The sign of the
derivative proves proposition 3 for all ηi, ηl such that q∗Pηi , q
∗P
ηl
are equilibria.
The same result applies with P of type 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: Mx,My,MW ,Mz are the number of voters respec-
tively in region A, Y,W,Z. VMi is the number of votes for A in region i.
Therefore
PWA = P (VMx + VMZ >
M
2
−MW )
P TA = P (VMx + VMZ =
M
2
−MW )
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PLA = P (VMx + VMZ <
M
2
−MW )
VMx is distributed as a binomial with parameters p,Mx, while VMz is dis-
tributed as a binomial with parameters 1 − p,Mz. The same probabilities
can be written as:
PWA = P (
VMx + VMZ
M
>
1
2
− MW
M
)
P TA = P (
VMx + VMZ
M
=
1
2
− MW
M
)
PLA = P (
VMx + VMZ
M
<
1
2
− MW
M
)
Remember that MW
M
converges to
∫
W
f . The average vote share for A will
be:
E
(
VMx + VMZ
M
)
=
Mx
M
p+
MZ
M
(1− p)
For the weak law of large numbers
VMx+VMZ
M
converges in probability to
p
∫
x
f + (1− p) ∫
Z
f , that is for any  > 0
lim
M→∞
P
(
|VMx + VMZ
M
− p
∫
x
f − (1− p)
∫
Z
f | > 
)
= 0.
Put differently for any  > 0 and for any δ > 0 there exists Mδ such that for
all M > Mδ
P
(
|VMx + VMZ
M
− p
∫
x
f − (1− p)
∫
Z
f | > 
)
< δ.
Let us suppose that p
∫
x
f + (1− p) ∫
Z
f − (1
2
− ∫
W
f) > . For all M > Mδ
PWA > 1 − δ and P TA = δ1, PLA = δ2 such that δ1 + δ2 < δ.  can be arbi-
trarily small, therefore if p
∫
x
f + (1 − p) ∫
Z
f − (1
2
− ∫
W
f) > 0 candidate
A’s probability of winning approximates one. The same reasoning applies
to p
∫
Z
f + (1 − p) ∫
X
f − (1
2
− ∫
Y
f) > 0, that is an equivalent condition
to p
∫
x
f + (1 − p) ∫
Z
f − (1
2
− ∫
W
f) < 0. In this situation candidate B’s
probability of winning approximates one.
Let us check the probabilities PWA , P
L
A , P
T
A , under the condition p
∫
x
f + (1−
p)
∫
Z
f − (1
2
− ∫
W
f) = 0.
Even though the Law of Large Numbers states that the realizations of
VMx+VMZ
M
will be close to p
∫
x
f+(1−p) ∫
Z
f as M grows, the probability of
VMx+VMZ
M
=
p
∫
x
f + (1− p) ∫
Z
f becomes small as M grows. The speed of convergence to
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zero is 1/
√
M , see Feller (2008), page 184. The Central Limit Theorem en-
sures that
√
M
[
VMx+VMZ
M
− p ∫
x
f − (1− p) ∫
Z
f
]
approaches a Normal dis-
tribution with mean 0 and 1. Therefore the distribution of
VMx+VMZ
M
will be
close to symmetric distribution as M grows larger. Therefore for any  > 0
there exists a M such that for all M > M |PWA −1/2| <  and |PLA−1/2| < ,
and P TA < .
Proof of Lemma 5: We now provide equilibrium strategies in the vot-
ing subgame for 2 and 3 candidates such that a third candidate never finds
convenient to enter. We do not specify what are the beliefs of voters on
the candidates’ implemented policies, because the proof is valid for every
array of beliefs that are common to all voters. If C(γ) = {A,B} all non
indifferent citizens vote for their favorite candidate and indifferent citizens
do not vote. This vector of strategies is a subgame Nash equilibrium and
does not include weakly dominated strategies. If C(γ) = {A,B,C}, where
A and B’s expected implemented policies satisfy condition 10, and voters
face three candidates8, equilibrium strategies are built as follows: all voters,
including C, that are non indifferent between A and B vote for their favorite
candidate among {A,B}. Voters that are indifferent between A and B but
strictly prefer C to either A or B vote for C. Voters that are indifferent
between A and B but prefer either A or B to C split: half of them vote for
A and half of them vote for B. This vector of strategies is a subgame Nash
equilibrium and does not include weakly dominated strategies. Voters that
are not indifferent between A and B do not change their vote because they
would make the other candidate win. Voters that are indifferent between A
and B and strictly prefer C get the same utility in equilibrium voting for
A,B,C or not voting. But voting for C is the only non weakly dominated
strategy they have. Indeed voting for C makes this kind of citizen strictly
better off than voting for A,B or not voting, when there are enough citizens
who vote for C such that she is pivotal. Citizens that are indifferent between
A and B and prefer either A,B to C get the same utility in equilibrium
voting for A,B,C or not voting. Let us assume they vote for A. Voting for
A is not weakly dominated by voting for B, but weakly dominates not voting
and voting for C. If there are enough citizens who vote for C such that this
kind of citizen is pivotal she prefers voting for A (or B) than voting for C or
not voting. The voting equilibrium strategies in the 3 candidates’ subgame
are built such that if A and B were tying when C was not running, they
are still tying with C running, because citizens that are indifferent between
8This specification is needed, because not all candidates could be drawn by Nature.
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A,B either vote for C or they split equally among A and B. Given these
voting equilibrium strategies, when voters face all 3 candidates, C loses with
certainty.
Proof of Theorem 1: the voting equilibrium is guaranteed by lemma
2, where expected policies are q¯A, q¯B. Now we check if any type of A
and B has an incentive to deviate not entering as a candidate. Condi-
tion 1 controls for that, indeed type t of candidate P does not deviate if
1
2
[
U(q∗Pt , Pt) + U(q¯−P , Pt)
]− c > U(q¯−P , Pt).
Proof of Theorem 2: the voting equilibrium is guaranteed by lemma 2,
where policies are qAt , qBs . Type t of candidate P runs because ps
2
[U(q∗Pt , Pt)+
U(q−Ps , Pt)]+(1−ps)U(q∗Pt , Pt)−c > psU(q−Ps , Pt)+(1−ps)U(qsq, Pt). Type
−t of candidate P does not run because ps
2
[U(q∗P−t , P−t) + U(q−Ps , P−t)] +
(1− ps)U(q∗P−t , P−t)− c < psU(q−Ps , P−t) + (1− ps)U(qsq, P−t). A third can-
didate, that wins against either At or Bs does not find convenient to enter
because pspt
2
[U(q∗At , r) + U(q∗Bs , r)] + (1− ptps)U(q∗r, r) < pspt2 [U(q∗At , r) +
U(q∗Bs , r)] + c + pt(1 − ps)U(q∗At , r) + ps(1 − pt)U(q∗Bs , r) + (1 − ps)(1 −
pt)U(q
sq, r). By 4 when facing both candidates r loses for sure. The same
reasoning applies to deviations from third candidates who are winning just
against one candidate between At and Bs, or sure losers.
Proof of Proposition 5 The total contribution yk to lobby k that max-
imizes citizen i’s utility is:
yk = y
M
k (ρ
i, qik, λ
i
k) =
[
ρPλPk λ
i
k(q
i
k − q∗k)(qLk − qPk )
ρi(λPk + ρ
PµLk )
2
]2
, (35)
where condition 35 is derived from the FOC of citizen i’s utility. If the
sum y−ik of other citizens’ contributions is already larger than the optimal
yMk (ρ
i, qik, λ
i
k), citizen i does not contribute. The equilibrium contribution to
lobby k is maxρ,qk,λk y
M
k , that represents the optimal contribution of citizens
whose idiosyncratic parameters ρ, qk, λk are the arg max of y
M
k . All other
citizens do not contribute, because their optimal total contribution is lower
than maxρ,qk,λk y
M
k .
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